An argument for the use of Aristotelian method in bioethics by Allmark, P. J.
An argument for the use of Aristotelian method in bioethics
ALLMARK, P. J.
Available from Sheffield Hallam University Research Archive (SHURA) at:
http://shura.shu.ac.uk/334/
This document is the author deposited version.  You are advised to consult the 
publisher's version if you wish to cite from it.
Published version
ALLMARK, P. J. (2006). An argument for the use of Aristotelian method in bioethics. 
Medicine, health care and philosophy, 9 (1), 69-79.
Repository use policy
Copyright © and Moral Rights for the papers on this site are retained by the 
individual authors and/or other copyright owners. Users may download and/or print 
one copy of any article(s) in SHURA to facilitate their private study or for non-
commercial research. You may not engage in further distribution of the material or 
use it for any profit-making activities or any commercial gain.
Sheffield Hallam University Research Archive
http://shura.shu.ac.uk 
Aristotelian method – resubmission: MHEP 296 
 1 
Running head: Aristotelian method – resubmission: MHEP 296 
Article type: Scientific contribution. 
Title: An argument for the use of Aristotelian method in bioethics.  [This 
is a resubmission of MHEP 296.] 
Author: Peter Allmark, PhD, University of Sheffield. 
Affiliation: Department of Acute and Critical Care Nursing, University of 
Sheffield. 
Name and address of corresponding author: Peter Allmark PhD./ 
Samuel Fox House/ Northern General Hospital/ Sheffield S5 7AU. 
Phone: 0114 226 6858 
Fax: 0114 271 4944 
Email: p.j.allmark@shef.ac.uk 
Word count: 8110 (including abstract and references). 
Key words: Method; bioethics; Aristotle; Aristotelian ethics; Virtue 
ethics. 
Acknowledgements:  Sara Rubinelli and Chris Megone 
 
Aristotelian method – resubmission: MHEP 296 
 2 
An argument for the use of Aristotelian method in bioethics 
 
Abstract 
The main claim of this paper is that the method outlined and used in 
Aristotle's Ethics is an appropriate and credible one to use in bioethics.  
Here “appropriate” means that the method is capable of establishing 
claims and developing concepts in bioethics and “credible” that the 
method has some plausibility, it is not open to obvious and immediate 
objection.  It begins by suggesting why this claim matters and then gives 
a brief outline of Aristotle's method.   
 
The main argument is made in three stages.  First, it is argued that 
Aristotelian method is credible because it compares favourably with 
alternatives.  In this section it is shown that Aristotelian method is not 
vulnerable to criticisms that are made both of methods that give a 
primary place to moral theory (such as utilitarianism) and those that 
eschew moral theory (such as casuistry and social science approaches).  
As such, it compares favourably with these other approaches that are 
vulnerable to at least some of these criticisms.  Second, the 
appropriateness of Aristotelian method is indicated through outlining how 
it would deal with a particular case.  Finally, it is argued that the success 
of Aristotle's philosophy is suggestive of both the credibility and 
appropriateness of his method. 
 
Aristotelian method – resubmission: MHEP 296 
 3 
I Introduction – Why does method matter? 
The main claim of this paper is that the method outlined and used in 
Aristotle's Ethics is an appropriate and credible one to use in bioethics.  
Here, “appropriate” means that the method is capable of establishing 
claims and developing concepts in bioethics and “credible” that the 
method has some plausibility, it is not open to obvious and immediate 
objection.   
 
The claim is of importance for at least two reasons.  First, it is incumbent 
on bioethicists to use an appropriate and credible method; the paper will 
argue that ethicists have erred where they have not done so.  Second, 
virtue ethics has re-emerged into the ethical mainstream, including 
applied ethics.  This process began with Anscombe‟s (1958) well-known 
article.  Many writers then pursued the theme that Aristotelian concepts, 
such as character and virtue, had been wrongly neglected since the 
enlightenment (most famously, MacIntyre, 1985; but there are many 
others, represented, for example, in the collection edited by Crisp, 1996).  
Virtue ethics has also made an appearance in bioethics.  Thus we see it 
applied to abortion (Hursthouse, 1987), mental illness (Megone, 2000) 
and a variety of other topics (for example, Shelp, 1985).  The primary 
source of the concepts used by virtue ethicists is Aristotle.  If these 
concepts were not derived from a credible and appropriate method then 
virtue ethics would be seriously undermined.  Thus, successfully 
showing Aristotle's ethical method to be appropriate and credible is 
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important for the defence of the more general use of virtue ethics in 
applied ethics.   
 
Before turning to the main argument the paper briefly outlines 
Aristotelian method.  The main argument is made in three stages.  First, 
it is argued that Aristotelian method is credible because it compares 
favourably with alternatives.  In this section it is shown that Aristotelian 
method is not vulnerable to criticisms that are made both of methods that 
give a primary place to moral theory (such as utilitarianism) and those 
that eschew moral theory (such as casuistry and social science 
approaches).  As such, it compares favourably with these other 
approaches that are vulnerable to at least some of these criticisms.  
Second, it is argued that Aristotelian method is appropriate through 
discussion of how it would deal with a particular case.  Finally, it is 
argued that the success of Aristotle's philosophy is suggestive of both 
the credibility and appropriateness of his method. 
 
II Aristotle's method 
The first step, then, is to set out Aristotle's method.  In doing this, the 
paper will by-pass many points of controversy and exegesis.  For these, 
the reader should look to other texts that describe and discuss the 
method in more detail (e.g. Megone, 1997; Irwin, 1988; Reeve, 1992; 
Nussbaum, 1986; Lear, 1988; Hardie 1980).   
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The word “method” derives ultimately from two Greek words.  These are 
meta (), which, in this context, means “in pursuit” and hodos („), 
which means “road” or “journey”.  Hence we may think of a method of 
inquiry as being a journey in pursuit of knowledge.  In bioethics that 
knowledge is ultimately practical, that is, knowledge of what we should 
do in certain situations.  Aristotle's ethical method can be thought of as 
consisting of three main stages.  These are, first, setting out the relevant 
phenomena, second, setting out the puzzles and third, developing an 
account to explain the phenomena and resolve the puzzles.  Taken 
together the method can be called dialectic, although the sense often 
given to that term, of the use of questions to draw out premises and 
conclusions in debate, is clearest in the third stage.  It is worth 
emphasising that the three stages are not chronological.  Usually it is the 
awareness of puzzles that stimulates inquiry; furthermore, new 
phenomena and puzzles may emerge when inquiry is well under way.  
With that in mind, we may now consider the stages in a little more detail. 
 
Stage one: setting out the phenomena/endoxa. 
For Aristotle, inquiry begins by attending to the phenomena, the world as 
it appears to us (Reeve, 1992, p. 35).  However, one should “filter” the 
phenomena, discarding the truly wayward (such as the ethical views of 
psychopaths).  In this context, Aristotle uses the term endoxa (singular, 
endoxon).   
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“Endoxa are those opinions accepted by everyone or by the majority or 
by the wise - either by all of them or by most or by the most notable and 
reputable.... For not every phenomenon is an endoxon.”  (Top. 100b21-6 
– cited and translated by Reeve, 1992, p. 35). 
 
In other words, endoxa are the phenomena that it is worthwhile 
bothering with; they are phenomena with “additional epistemic weight” 
(Reeve, 1992, p.37).  This weight will derive from different sources.  If a 
phenomenon is an opinion shared by everyone, or if an expert in the 
field possesses it, then it is an endoxon.  Thus the source of the endoxa 
that are the starting point for ethical inquiry are all relevant opinions held 
either by the wise or by many people (provided they are sufficiently 
mature, NE 1095a5). 
 
It is important to note that the endoxa will usually consist of more than 
people‟s ethical opinions.  Phenomena are the world as it appears and is 
experienced by us very broadly (Nussbaum, 1986, p. 245).  Thus ethical 
inquiry into, say, the ethics of abortion will include social scientific 
research showing women‟s experiences of, and beliefs about, the 
subject; it will include biological information about the development of the 
embryo; and it will, of course, include the writings of ethicists on the 
topic.  Presently, it will be argued that this is an important strength of the 
Aristotelian approach (in section III.3).   
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Stage two: setting out the puzzles. 
The second stage of the method involves setting out the puzzles.  (The 
Greek term for “puzzles” is ; hence Aristotle's method is 
sometimes termed “aporetic”.  Literally, the term means “difficulties of 
passage”; this relates nicely to the idea that method is a road or journey 
in pursuit of knowledge.)  These puzzles will be such things as clashes 
of opinion and incomplete knowledge.  Puzzles to do with incomplete 
knowledge show us that we do not have the explanation, we cannot 
deductively explain the beliefs that we have.  As such it means that we 
do not know that the belief is true.  Puzzles to do with conflicting beliefs 
show that we do not have true beliefs, or more precisely, that not all of 
the beliefs, or endoxa, are true. 
 
As well as showing us that the endoxa need attention, the puzzles 
enable us to see more clearly where attention should be focused.  
Aristotle warns that those who inquire without attending to the puzzles 
are likely to offer poor accounts and solutions (see Met 955a27-b4).  To 
ignore a puzzle is to risk establishing a false account that does not 
resolve it.  As already stated, it is usually puzzles that stimulate inquiry.  
However, Smith (1997, p. xviii) refers to the application of Aristotelian 
method as a “first mover” in philosophical inquiry.  He suggests that 
investigation of (apparently puzzle-free) phenomena may reveal puzzles 
and shake us from our complacency. 
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Stage three: explaining the phenomena and resolving the puzzles. 
The third stage of Aristotle‟s method is the most controversial.  I shall 
begin with points that are generally agreed.  The first is that the goal of 
the third stage is resolution of the puzzles.  However, it would be feasible 
to offer an account of something that resolves the puzzles by throwing 
out all, or most, of the endoxa.  Aristotle's method does not permit this.  
One must resolve the puzzles but also explain the phenomena.  The 
Greek verb translated by “explain” is , which is also translated 
as “to establish” and “to prove”.  Aristotle believes most phenomena, 
certainly those which qualify as endoxa, to be “not entirely in error but 
correct on one point at least, or even most points” (NE 1098b29).  It 
follows that the best account will explain the true elements contained in 
the false viewpoints and the source of error as well as explaining the 
truth of the true viewpoint.  This means that the final account must refer 
back to the endoxa.  It must show why many, probably most, of the 
endoxa are true as well as explaining the false ones. 
 
A second point that is generally agreed about stage three is that it is 
here that the dialectical nature of Aristotle's method is seen most clearly.  
Dialectic can be seen approximately as the use of question and answer 
to establish premises that are used to reach conclusions.  These 
conclusions might be unacceptable to the answerer, thus forcing him to 
re-think his answers, or they might be acceptable, thus enabling him to 
see implications of his position.  Earlier philosophers, such as Plato, 
Zeno and Socrates had used dialectic, but Aristotle developed it into its 
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most systematic form (particularly in Topics, although it is also seen 
clearly in the Nicomachean Ethics). 
 
The puzzles thrown up in stage two of ethical inquiry are likely to be 
those of conflicting belief.  In such cases, dialectic involves “making a 
new start” (NE 1174a13-14, 1145a15).  Faced with conflicting beliefs 
one should go back a step onto more certain ground.  Thus, if two 
people disagree over something then one seeks more fundamental 
ground on which they agree.  More precisely, one should move from the 
conflicting viewpoints onto ground that is unchallenged by the puzzles.  
From this point one argues deductively forward to the area of 
disagreement and, hopefully, is able to show what is right and wrong, 
and how the error came to be made.   
 
This takes us into a more controversial area: the role of first principles.  
Aristotle contrasts dialectic with demonstration.  In demonstration one 
shows the truth of a conclusion by proceeding deductively from true 
premises.  The ultimate demonstration is one that proceeds from first 
principles.  These are primary features of the world that explain the 
phenomena/endoxa but which cannot themselves be explained.  
Aristotle's vision of a “complete science” is one that has a set of first 
principles which explain all the phenomena under its purview (Irwin, 
1988).  In dialectic one proceeds inductively from phenomena/endoxa.  
Where one proceeds to is a matter of controversy (Sim, 1999).  For 
some commentators, dialectic is the method by which one achieves first 
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principles that are then used in demonstration.  Others believe it is a 
method used for persuasion, the testing of claims, the development of 
questions or, finally, the development of knowledge short of first 
principles.  For all these commentators, first principles are generated, if 
at all, by methods other than dialectic.  The key problem with dialectic, 
from their point of view, is that it seems hard to understand how one can 
move from the matters of belief that constitute endoxa towards the 
indubitable matters of fact that constitute first principles.  I shall return to 
this problem presently. 
 
This, then, is an outline of Aristotle's method.  It starts with endoxa and 
ends with points of agreement from which a deductive demonstration 
can proceed.  The precise nature of those points of agreement, whether 
they constitute first principles, matter of truth that are less than first 
principles, or simply rhetorically achieved points, is disputed.  We turn 
next to the main claim of the paper, that Aristotle's method is appropriate 
and credible for use in bioethics.  The first step here is to show how the 
method compares favourably with others.   
 
III Aristotle's method compares favourably with alternatives 
That endoxa should be a starting point in bioethical discussion is 
perhaps beyond dispute.  It is hard to imagine writing about such topics 
as euthanasia or abortion without reference to views held.  This is 
particularly so given that the stimulus for discussion is likely to be 
conflicts between those views.  Thus the second stage of Aristotle's 
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method, setting out the puzzles, is also fairly uncontroversial.  The third 
stage is more problematic: resolving the puzzles, explaining the endoxa 
and, arguably, moving towards first principles.  All writers will, 
presumably, seek a resolution of puzzles.  However, they may disagree 
with the two other elements.   
 
Critics may espouse one of at least two alternative methods.  The first is 
a theory-led method, such as utilitarianism or Kantianism.  Such 
approaches are willing to “leave behind” endoxa and to espouse 
counter-intuitive results if that is what the theory implies.  The second is 
a practice-led method, such as casuistry or (particularist) care ethics.  
Some such approaches will see no role for theories and first principles 
being led instead by, for example, intuitions in the particular situation.  
Here I shall defend Aristotle's method of explaining endoxa and moving 
towards first principles.  Indeed, I shall argue that explaining endoxa 
requires something like a move towards first principles.  In doing this I 
shall engage with theory-led and practice-led approaches, attempting to 
show the superiority of the Aristotelian approach. 
 
III.1 Explaining the endoxa 
As we‟ve seen, Aristotle requires a solution of puzzles to establish, prove 
or explain () the endoxa.  This will involve paying close 
attention to the endoxa; we should assume that they are either true or 
true in part.  If the latter, we should look for the site of error.  The endoxa 
should be used to check our conclusions; we should be reluctant to 
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accept a solution with absurd or abhorrent conclusions.  As Aristotle 
states, 
 
“Care must be taken not to uphold a hypothesis which is generally 
unacceptable.  There are two ways in which it may be unacceptable.  It 
may be one that leads to the making of absurd statements … or it may 
be one which a bad character would choose.” (Topics 160b17-22). 
 
The main source of criticism of this approach will arise from those who 
believe bioethics should be theory-led.  An important example of this 
approach is that of Hare (1975, p. 201) who states,  
 
“If philosophers are going to apply ethical theory successfully to practical 
issues, they must first have a theory.”  
 
In Hare‟s case this theory is to be developed through attention to an 
analysis of language.  He argues that we have intuitions that serve us 
much of the time (what he calls, “level one thinking”).  Where these 
break down we need to adopt level two thinking, drawing on ethical 
theory.  Such thinking is above our intuitions and hence has no need to 
“explain” them.  Furthermore, should the conclusions prove 
counterintuitive or repugnant then, provided we have our theory right, we 
should not be concerned.  Peter Singer adopts this position 
enthusiastically.  Led by his own theory (shared with Hare) of preference 
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utilitarianism, Singer often draws conclusions that shock.  Here are two 
examples (from Singer, 1993, p. 169 and 191, respectively).   
 
“…no fetus has the same claim to life as a person ... these arguments 
apply to the newborn baby as much as to the fetus.” 
 
“...killing a disabled infant is not morally equivalent to killing a person.  
Very often it is not wrong at all.” 
 
Singer goes on to argue that it is permissible to kill brain damaged, but 
conscious (although not “self-conscious”) humans if their lives are, on 
the whole, miserable (Singer, 1993, p. 192).  Singer is not the only writer 
who is willing to settle issues in ways that contravene strongly held 
tenets of ethical belief.  Harris‟s (1975) article, “The survival lottery”, in 
which he seems to advocate killing people in order to save the lives of 
others through organ donation, is a famous example. 
 
Kantians also share this theory-led approach; an example is O‟Neill 
(2001).  She has applied a Kantian conception of autonomy to issues in 
bioethics.  She objects, in particular, to the “individual view” of autonomy, 
the view that autonomy is an attribute of most adults and most of their 
actions.  She develops instead her own Kantian view of “principled 
autonomy” (which differs markedly from that developed by other 
Kantians such as Hill [1995] and Korsgaard [1996]).  On this account 
autonomy is a characteristic of the principle behind action rather than of 
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the action per se and is not a characteristic of agents at all.   The 
problem here is that O‟Neill is willing to discard very strongly held 
endoxa without a “by your leave”.  An Aristotelian would be reluctant to 
give up the “individual view” of autonomy and would certainly want a 
good explanation of why this “false” view had come to be so strongly 
held.  It should also be recalled that whilst O‟Neill avoids abhorrent 
conclusions, Kant himself does not, as, for example, where his absolute 
injunction against lying would lead to great harm (Kant AK 8:427, 1997). 
  
In response, both Kantians and Utilitarians will share Hare‟s concern 
about the attention Aristotelian method pays to endoxa.  This is that it 
leaves one locked in “level one” thinking whenever our intuitions break 
down.  Theory of some kind is required to move beyond this.   
 
“How should we choose between … conflicting intuitions?  Is it simply a 
contest in rhetoric?” (Hare, 1975, p. 203). 
 
The first point to be made in response here is that the theory-led method 
of dealing with conflicting intuitions is unsatisfactory (Norman, 2000).  
The application of dialectic does not leave one locked at “level one”.  
One starts with endoxa but is able to resolve disputes by moving to more 
basic shared beliefs.  To take a common enough example, disputes 
about abortion are often taken forward through examination of what our 
fundamental beliefs are concerning what is a human being and why it is 
generally wrong to kill them.  Whilst the abortion debate is far from 
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settled, it seems wrong to say that there has been no progress, no 
movement from “level one”.  By contrast, the imposition of ethical theory 
is unpromising.  Faced with an apparently absurd or abhorrent 
conclusion, very few will be persuaded simply because that conclusion 
was reached from a plausible moral theory (such as, say, preference 
utilitarianism).  In this context it is noteworthy that Thomson‟s (1971) 
contribution to the abortion debate, which Hare criticises for its reliance 
on “intuition”, has been far more influential than Hare‟s own rather 
bizarre contribution (Hare, 1975). 
 
This leads to a second point in defence of Aristotelian method.  Bioethics 
is applied ethics.  As such, its main purpose is to reach agreement on 
action.  Approaches that fail to pay due regard to endoxa, particularly 
where they reach jarring or abhorrent conclusions, will neither achieve 
success rhetorically nor, therefore, practically.  An Aristotelian can 
eventually come to a conclusion that is out of line with the majority view, 
Aristotle himself does, but he should do so in a way that does not leave 
the majority behind.  His conclusion must be reached in ways that draw 
upon other, more fundamental, endoxa.  He should also be able to 
explain why the false view held by the majority (or by the wise) seemed 
plausible.  Above all, one‟s first instinct when faced with a repugnant or 
counterintuitive thesis should be that one is likely to have erred; one 
should be reluctant to embrace it.   
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Nonetheless, a critic may say that all one might achieve through dialectic 
is rhetorical success (Smith, 1999).  Agreement between disputants is 
no sign that they have reached the correct result; they might both be 
wrong.  More charitably, the critic might say that dialectic does have a 
role, but only a persuasive one once one has reached the correct result 
through other means.  If dialectic is to reach true results and (a fortiori) 
first principles then it must be because of the basic reliability of the 
endoxa: they must be true for the most part, as Aristotle claims.  But why 
should one accept this?  It seems, then, that a defence of Aristotle's 
requirement to explain the endoxa needs, in turn, a defence of the belief 
that Aristotelian method moves towards truth and, perhaps, first 
principles.  If dialectic does not move towards truth then there is no need 
to explain the endoxa as they may all be wrong.  Let us then turn to this 
task. 
 
III.2 Moving to first principles 
Both theory-led and practice-led critics may argue that dialectic cannot 
deliver first principles.  It seems to require that people reach agreement 
through finding common ground.  At best, this will achieve a consistent, 
puzzle-free set of beliefs; but there seems no reason to believe a 
consistent set to be true.  It might be possible for there to co-exist sets of 
beliefs that are internally consistent but incompatible.  At that point, the 
Aristotelian method would have no way of deciding which set to prefer. 
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From a practice-led perspective there are at least two further criticisms.  
In the first place, some particularists may doubt the existence of first 
principles at all.  Dancy (1992) considers the utilitarian principle of 
maximising happiness or preference satisfaction.  It is well known that 
such a principle can lead to absurd results.  However, in the case of 
public executions it is the application of the principle itself that 
contributes to the wrong; part of what is wrong with public executions is 
precisely that it increases happiness and satisfies preferences; Dancy 
doubts that there are principles of any kind that can be drawn from 
ethical theory and applied to practical cases (Dancy, 1996).   
 
Others in the practice-led camp might concede the existence of first 
principles but doubt their utility in applied ethics.  Those making this 
criticism might include Aristotelians influenced by casuistry, such as 
McDowell (1979) and casuists influence by Aristotelianism, such as 
Jonsen (1991).  Both emphasise the role of practical wisdom in ethical 
decision-making.  For McDowell, the virtuous agent, who possesses 
practical wisdom, will know the right reasons for action and will behave 
accordingly.  However, the reasons he gives for his behaviour will be 
unconvincing to a non-virtuous agent.  Thus, first principles are known 
by virtuous agents but are not persuasive to others; the non-virtuous 
cannot know them.  In terms of applied ethics, presuming there are 
many non-virtuous agents (as Aristotle believes, NE 1150a12) this looks 
like a dead end. 
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That dialectic cannot deliver first principles (or approach them) is the key 
criticism.  There have been many attempts to tackle it; I shall focus on 
those made by Irwin (1988) and Bäck (1999).  Irwin posits two types of 
dialectic.  The first is pure dialectic.  This seeks to resolve puzzles by 
making a new start from premises that are not challenged by those 
puzzles.  Irwin accepts that pure dialectic can only deliver sets of beliefs 
that are consistent but not necessarily true.  The second is strong 
dialectic.  This also makes a new start from premises not challenged by 
puzzles.  However, it draws upon a particular subset of premises.  Not 
only are these premises unchallenged by the puzzles, they are also such 
as to be almost impossible to deny.  By the use of this subset of 
premises, strong dialectic is able to deliver sets of beliefs that are true. 
 
Irwin claims that Aristotle makes extensive use of strong dialectic.  He 
begins his case for this argument with Aristotle's Metaphysics.  In the 
Metaphysics Aristotle considers the case of someone who denies certain 
bedrock beliefs.  One such is the principle of non-contradiction.  This 
holds that it is not possible for contradictory statements to be true (Irwin, 
1988, p. 547).  Aristotle suggests that a denial of this principle is 
impossible to state coherently.  The details of the argument are not 
required here.  The point is that the principle of non-contradiction is not 
just generally agreed but that it cannot be coherently rebutted.  
According to Irwin, Aristotle develops the method of strong dialectic in 
the Metaphysics.  He creates and uses premises that are not just 
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matters of general agreement but which are the presuppositions to any 
inquiry. 
 
Even were one to accept Irwin‟s account, however, one may doubt 
whether it helps to overcome the problem in relation to ethical concepts.  
Aristotle does not appear to use strong dialectic in the Nicomachean 
Ethics.  The endoxa that are the starting points in ethics are such things 
as widely held beliefs to do with happiness and virtue; and the 
explanations to which these lead seem far weaker than those first 
principles to which strong dialectic is supposed to appeal, such as the 
principle of non-contradiction.  It follows that Aristotle's conclusions in 
the Nicomachean Ethics are open to sceptical doubt even if those in the 
Metaphysics are not.  Irwin‟s response is to say that Aristotle does, in 
fact, use strong dialectic in the Nicomachean Ethics (Irwin, 1988, esp. 
chapters 15-18).  In particular, he appeals to basic principles that are not 
open to reasonable dispute and which are often derived from other 
areas of the Aristotelian corpus, themselves based on strong dialectic.   
The function argument illustrates this point (NE 1097b24ff – see also, 
the discussion by Whiting, 1988).  This is the argument that derives a 
definition of happiness from the premise that man has a function (): 
to reason well.  One thing that is striking about the function argument is 
the way Aristotle imports a number of ideas from other areas of his 
thought. For example, he imports the idea that there are things that are 
natural kinds (i.e. living things) which have teleological, goal-directed 
natures; that the form, or soul, of these natural kinds lies in their goal or 
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telos; that there are three main types of soul (nutritive, perceptive, 
rational); and that natural kinds possess an intrinsic good in performing 
their function (unlike artefacts).  Irwin argues that these premises are 
ultimately derived from strong dialectic used by Aristotle in other works.  
As such, someone who challenges his conclusion will be subject to 
serious problems in his reasoning and in living of his life.   
 
However, Nussbaum (1986, pp. 257-8) makes the point that it seems 
one can opt out of the first principles of ethics (such as temperance) 
rather easier than one can from the first principles of metaphysics (such 
as the principle of non-contradiction).  In the latter case one seems to be 
required to opt out of human life altogether; in the former case one can 
live in society, although perhaps not well, or fully part of it.  Therefore, 
Irwin overstates his case. 
 
Bäck (1999) takes a different tack.  He draws a parallel between 
Aristotle's approach and Popper‟s fallibilism in the philosophy of science 
(Popper, 1989).  The key point here is that science proceeds by making 
fallible conjectures that it then subjects to rigorous testing.  In the same 
way, Bäck suggests that dialectical reasoning should be seen not as a 
sure-fire mechanism for achieving first principles but rather as a fallible 
means of moving towards them and of subjecting them to rigorous 
scrutiny. 
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Bäck and Irwin show that there are resources to rebut the criticism that 
dialectic cannot deliver.   To this one may add that, as shown earlier, 
theory-led approaches seem unable to offer a better way of moving 
towards first principles.  However, this leaves in place the two criticisms 
from the practice-led position.  The first of these is based on the view 
that there are no first principles.  From such a perspective, one would 
not move towards first principles through the use of dialectic.  Rather, 
one would generate principles that differed on a case-by-case basis 
because, in reality, it is the cases rather than the principles that lead us 
to a solution.  The second criticism is based on the view that there are 
first principles but that they do not help in practical situations; what is 
required there is practical wisdom. 
 
In response it is worth stating first that Aristotelian method is not 
particularly hostile to casuistry and particularism.  Indeed there are many 
proponents of combinations of these views.  Furthermore, Bäck‟s 
fallibilist position looks highly compatible with casuist methods that 
derive tentative principles from paradigm cases with a view to applying 
(and thereby testing) them on other cases (Kuczewski, 1998).  The key 
area of disagreement will be between Aristotelians who apply great 
philosophical import to dialectic as a method of achieving or approaching 
first principles and those, Aristotelian and others, who do not.   
 
There are at least two reasons one might favour the “first principle” 
camp.  The first is that achieving first principles through dialectic is what 
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Aristotle appears to attempt in, for example, the Nicomachean Ethics.  
Other writers have attempted to show how proposed first principles 
derived through Aristotelian method, such as virtue and happiness, can 
be used in applied ethics (Crisp, 1996; Hursthouse, 1987).  The second 
reason is that those who deny the role of first principles in applied ethics 
seem to describe wrongly the role of practical wisdom.  Their approach 
looks like naïve intuitionism, in which people, or certain people, intuitively 
grasp what is right without recourse to reasoning or principles.  However, 
neither intuitionism nor practical wisdom based theories require this 
(Nelson, 1999).  Practical wisdom is best viewed as educated intuition.  
The practically wise agent grasps the right course of action in the same 
way that an art expert grasps that a certain painting is a fake: it is 
intuition, but it is best on experience, principles and reflection.  And in 
ethics, dialectic is key to that education. 
 
To summarise: Aristotelian method has been subject to criticism from 
both theory-led and practice-led commentators.  These criticisms have 
included the denial of the importance of explaining the endoxa and a 
denial of the role of first principles (or the ability of dialectic to reach 
them).  I argued that explaining the endoxa is important at least for 
rhetorical reasons; without it, the theory-led approaches are 
unpersuasive when they reach counter-intuitive results.  However, 
arguing that explaining the endoxa is more important than this requires 
that one show that dialectic can approach first principles.  I described 
Irwin‟s and Bäck‟s attempts to do this: the latter seems particularly 
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promising as it is compatible with both Popperian critical realism and 
with some elements of casuistry.   There is at least one further argument 
in favour of Aristotelian method. 
 
III.3 The social science critique of applied ethics 
Hedgecoe (2004) describes what he terms “the social science critique of 
applied ethics”.  This critique focuses particularly on what has been 
termed here the “theory-led approach” represented by utilitarianism, 
Kantianism and the principles approach.  Put simply, the criticism is that 
such approaches give a dominant role to the idealised, rational thought 
represented by their theories and ignore important evidence from the 
social sciences.  This matters because what is “applied” in moral 
decision-making is a great deal more than moral theory.  For example, 
identifying and describing a situation as one that requires a moral 
decision always draws upon resources outside moral theory.  
Furthermore, these descriptions rarely contain components that sit 
neatly within moral theory, such as “autonomous agent”, “disease”, 
“person”, “preferences”, “universalizability” and so forth.  By imposing 
such categories on discussion, bioethics renders itself worthless to 
genuine decision-making. 
 
In some senses this criticism echoes that made from the standpoint of 
casuists and related schools (such as “caring ethics”).  The net result is 
that ethicists are enjoined to adopt a “bottom-up” approach.  However, 
the social science critique may take this further, suggesting that our main 
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attention be focused on empirical research showing us how people 
construct moral problems and deal with them.  Hedgecoe points out that 
bioethics performed in this way would lose its critical, normative edge.  
He advocates, instead, what he terms “critical bioethics”.  He describes a 
number of characteristics of this approach: these include that it is 
empirically rooted and theory challenging.  Let us examine these two 
characteristics. 
 
Hedgecoe describes critical bioethics as “resolutely bottom up”.  It 
begins from the problems that arise and how those appear to 
participants.  He goes on to say that for bioethicists, the “first port of call 
should be the social science literature about that technology, rather than 
the standard bioethics debates.”  This is what it means to be empirically 
rooted.   
 
Critical ethics is also theory challenging.  Here it is best to quote 
Hedgecoe (2004, p. 137) at greater length. 
 
“This does not mean that philosophical ethical theories (covering all 
levels of aempirical speculation, not just traditional meta-theoretical 
issues) are worthless, simply that critical bioethics tests its theories in 
the light of empirical experience, and changes them as a result.” 
 
The starting point for Aristotelian method, it will be recalled, is the 
endoxa – the world as it appears to the participants.  Furthermore, the 
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endoxa are used as a check on solutions: an adequate solution must 
explain the endoxa.  As such, Aristotelian method seems to meet 
Hedgecoe‟s requirement for an empirically rooted, bottom up approach.  
However, unlike the bottom up approaches of pure social science, and of 
some of the bottom up approaches in applied ethics, such as caring 
ethics, it retains a normative, critical edge; Aristotelian method enables 
us to move beyond description of endoxa to the resolution of puzzles in 
them.  The next section outlines an example of how this might be done. 
 
IV An example of Aristotle's method applied to a case in bioethics 
It is not uncommon for hospital staff to be confronted by a young person, 
say, a twenty year-old man who has deliberately taken a drug overdose, 
perhaps following a disappointment in love (Hassan et al, 1999).  He 
refuses life-saving treatment.  The key decision here is whether to treat 
the man without his consent.  If the decision is made not to do this, the 
next issue is of how much pressure to bear on him to change his mind.  
Thus, inquiry is stimulated by the need to make the decision and the 
presence of a puzzle.  For hospital stuff the likelihood is that they will feel 
it would be a tragedy were they to let the man die; the “end of the world” 
injuries suffered by the lovesick young usually heal.  However, the legal 
position seems to be against forcible treatment; and there will be those 
who would question the bringing of pressure on the man (e.g. through 
graphic description of his likely suffering, or of the suffering he will bring 
on others).   
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There are plenty of endoxa to draw upon here.  Some have been 
outlined simply in describing the situation.  There will also be beliefs 
derived from writings on informed consent.  Many of these will focus on 
autonomy.  The views of the wise are reasonably easy to elicit from 
writings specifically to do with autonomy or to do with related topics such 
as consent.  Because autonomy is a fairly technical term, the views of 
the many are more recondite but can be extracted from empirical 
research on such things as informed consent (e.g. Mason & Allmark, 
2000) and, perhaps, from general literature and from thought 
experiments.   
 
The endoxa and puzzles that arise seem to be divisible into those to do 
with the nature of autonomy and those to do with its value.  With regard 
to the nature of autonomy, the endoxa indicate that the term autonomy 
means “self-rule” and implies something greater than being 
unconstrained. The ability to rule oneself is such that most adults are 
autonomous, whilst animals, young children and the severely mentally ill 
are not.  Similarly, adults acting from alien desires (such as those 
implanted in an unknowing agent through hypnosis) are not 
autonomous, at least in relation to those desires.  The facility for self-rule 
possessed by most adults seems to have some relation to their 
rationality.  Finally, there is some form of relationship between moral 
responsibility and autonomy.  In particular, we do not hold agents 
morally responsible unless they are autonomous agents and, in general, 
unless their acts are autonomous.   
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On the value of autonomy, it seems that people do value their freedom 
to choose and their ability to do so; the loss of autonomy in an adult 
(through disease or accident) is viewed as a tragedy.  In theoretical 
terms this is reflected in, for example, the principles approach through 
the principle of respect for autonomy.   
 
However, the puzzle with which we began is reflected in these endoxa 
also.  In the first place, there is the question of whether the man‟s 
decision to refuse treatment is an autonomous one.  Some approaches, 
especially those influenced by Kant, would doubt that his choice is 
rational enough to count as autonomous and, therefore, worthy of 
“respect”.  Other approaches set less stringent criteria; in the UK the law 
sides with these approaches.  Provided the man understands the 
consequences of his action, believes this information, and can retain and 
process it then he is “competent” (Kennedy & Grubb, 2000).  The young 
man here seems to meet those criteria.  Further to this, though, even if it 
were agreed that his choice is autonomous, there would be a question of 
whether autonomy is of such value that the man should be permitted to 
die in its name.   
 
This gives us enough endoxa and puzzles.  Aristotelian method requires 
now that we “make a new start”; we must move dialectically towards first 
principles with a view to constructing an account that resolves the 
puzzles and explains the endoxa.  Fully to do this would require a further 
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paper; however, it is possible to offer some hints.  We are looking for an 
account of the nature and value of autonomy.  A good starting point 
might be the endoxon concerning moral agency and autonomy.  In 
general we hold only autonomous agents to be morally responsible, and 
only for their autonomous actions.  It is reasonable to posit that it is only 
moral agents who are autonomous rather than, say, animals.  This takes 
us to a new realm: what is the difference between animals and humans 
such that only the latter can be held morally accountable?  According to 
Aristotle, it is the presence of reasoned desire rather than just appetite.  
Humans develop views about what it is worthwhile pursuing; this is their 
vision of the good.  As such, they are accountable not just for what they 
do but also for what they desire.  It is this that is at the heart of moral 
agency and, therefore, of autonomy.   
 
If we switch this back to the young man, we could ask whether his action 
is one for which we would hold him morally accountable: would we 
blame him?  I shall simply assert that we would.  His action is 
autonomous because it reflects his character.  This tells us something 
more.  Autonomous action can be wrong; it can reflect bad or weak 
character.  Should we then respect the autonomous action of those who 
are not virtuous?  Again, this takes us to a different realm.  The question 
here is why we value autonomy.  Stated very baldly, Aristotle would say 
autonomy is of value because of its place in a good, happy life.  
Autonomy is a necessary component of such a life for at least two 
reasons.  The first is that a human cannot be happy unless he is 
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autonomous.  This is because autonomy requires virtue, virtue is a state 
of moral character, and moral character is possessed only by 
autonomous agents.  The second reason is that humans need to 
exercise autonomy in order to be happy.  A virtuous agent unable to act 
would not be happy.  Furthermore, non-virtuous agents need to exercise 
virtue in order to be happy.  It is only through reflecting on such mistakes 
that agents can develop their vision of the good towards virtue.   
 
Thus we have, in general, good reason to respect autonomy: to allow 
people to develop their character even though they may make mistakes.  
However, the fact that people can be mistaken suggests that the way 
respect for autonomy manifests itself will vary from case to case.  We 
would respect the autonomy of people making what seem to be the right 
decisions unequivocally.  By contrast, where people are making flawed 
decisions it is permissible in most cases to engage with them, to attempt 
to get them to see reason.  Thus the health carers‟ should at least try 
and persuade the young man to change his mind is supported on this 
account.  Whether or not they should override his decision is moot.  
Legally it is not acceptable, and that may be enough to decide against 
doing so.  However, the man‟s decision may be seen as so flawed and 
so disastrous to his prospect of happiness that paternalism may be 
morally if not legally justified.  Similar arguments might justify 
paternalistic legislation against, for example, some recreational drugs. 
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The discussion of the case here is, of necessity, very brief.  It is not 
intended to be persuasive.  The purpose of the discussion is, rather, to 
show the way Aristotelian method would proceed on a particular case or 
issue.  Endoxa and puzzles are gathered and then an attempt is made to 
make a new start.  In this case, that was done by looking to the ground 
on which we attribute moral accountability to agents, and by looking to 
the ground on which we attribute value to human action.  Finally, there 
should be explanation of the endoxa and resolution of the puzzles.  Two 
examples will suffice from the discussion here. 
 
First, we began with the belief held by health carers that some form of 
intervention would be justified to prevent this man‟s death, be that 
intervention forcible or persuasive.  This account has explained that 
belief by suggesting that while his action is autonomous it is also wrong; 
the carers are (at least) justified in attempting to get him to see reason.  
Second, we noted a clash of beliefs in relation to whether or not the 
man‟s action is autonomous.  The Aristotelian account has come down 
on the side of saying that the action is autonomous.  However, it also 
explains the belief that it is not by showing that, insofar as it is wrong, it 
is not fully rational.  Before concluding, there is one further point in 
favour of the credibility and appropriateness of Aristotelian method. 
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V. Aristotle's development and use of his method gives it some 
credibility. 
The final point is an appeal to authority.  The method has credibility 
because it was developed and used by Aristotle.  Aristotle's philosophy 
has stood the test of time; it is still widely debated and many aspects of it 
are defended.  In that his philosophy is a product of his method, this 
suggests that the method is capable of delivering worthwhile results. 
 
This second point depends on a premise that needs defence: that 
Aristotle does consistently use his method.  The need to defend the 
premise arises because there are times when Aristotle appears not to 
use the method.  One example is the way he appears to reject the lives 
of pleasure, honour, and moneymaking as candidates for constituting a 
happy life without trying to explain these endoxa (NE 1095b5-1096a10).  
Another example is the way voluntariness is simply defined as the 
opposite of involuntariness without any apparent attempt at dialectical 
argument (NE 1110a1).   
 
A plausible response to this is that here Aristotle is relying on the 
conclusion of a dialectical argument that has been made in another work 
or at a different point in the same work.  In the case of the definition of 
voluntariness the dialectical argument occurs in the Eudemian Ethics 
(Sauve-Meyer, 1993).  At other times the dialectical argument occurs in 
the Nicomachean Ethics, but is scattered around.  This is the case with 
the first example where, for example, Aristotle has an extensive 
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discussion of pleasure in Book VII: as such, he does not dismiss it as 
lightly as he seems to in Book I.  Furthermore, we have already seen 
how Irwin argues that Aristotle‟s ethics uses many premises from 
elsewhere in the corpus.  Thus, a defence can be made of the claim that 
Aristotle is consistent in the use of his method even though he appears 
occasionally not to be.  This is reinforced by the fact that Aristotle does 
often lay out his argument in a way that shows precisely that he is using 
the method (Lear, 1988, pp. 4-5). 
 
Conclusion 
This paper has argued that the application of Aristotelian method in 
bioethics is credible in that it compares well with alternatives and is able 
to respond to criticism.  It has argued also that the method is 
appropriate, able to deliver results, through discussion of a specific 
example.  Finally, an argument from authority was used to defend both 
the credibility and appropriateness of the method.   
 
Two of the three steps of Aristotelian method are likely to be shared with 
non-Aristotelians.  These are setting out of the endoxa and of the 
puzzles; the third step, the move to first principles that explain endoxa 
and resolve the puzzles, is more controversial.  However, those who 
dispute it should consider the importance of explaining deeply held 
views.  In particular, controversial conclusions are little more than 
rhetoric unless they draw upon deeper, non-controversial views.  They 
are unlikely to be persuasive in the practical, decision-making realm of 
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bioethics.  Conversely, there is a need to move beyond the beliefs 
people hold where those beliefs are confronted with puzzles; Aristotelian 
method shows how this can be done without becoming theory-led and 
isolated. 
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